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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17620

JAMES vHLLAF.D HEAl<N,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the denial of a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus by the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, Judge, in
the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County.
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IIJ '.lHB SUPkEME COURT OF THE STA·rE OF UTAH

S'!i>.T E OF UTAH

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17620

J .~i·lES vHLLARD HEARN

1

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus which challenged the validity of a
Utah detainer pending against appellant.

Appellant is

presently confined in the federal prison in Marion, Illinois.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on February 15, 1980 in the First Judicial District
Court of Utah,
T~

the Honorable Venoy Christofferson, presiding.

petition was denied on the grounds tnat the court had no

jurisdiction because appellant, at the time, was not
tmprisoned in Utah.

This Court,

in State v. Hearn, Utah,
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621 P.2d 707 (1980), held that the lower court did have
jurisdiction over the matter and remanded the petition for
further proceedings.

On February 23, 1981 a hearing was ~k

in the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable VeNoy
Christofferson, presiding (H.R. 41).1

Appellant was

represented at the hearing by Clint S. Judkins.

On February

24, 1981 the petition was again denied (H.R. 42).

I t is fro"'

this denial that appellant brings this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Order denying
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 20, 1970, while serving a sentence in the
Washington State Prison in Walla Walla, appellant was served
with a warrant for his arrest pursuant to a robbery
pending against him in Utah.

char~

Pursuant to the terms of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereafter IAD), appellant
was taken to Utah where he was tried and convicted in
First Judicial District Court of Utah on the robbery
(T.R. 35).

t~
chM~

Thereafter, appellant was sentenced to a term in

the Utah State Prison (T.R. 44).

After appellant began his

Utah sentence, Washington officials requested that he be
lFor convenience, citations to the trial record are given
herein as (T.R.
) and citations to the Habeas Corpus reccr
are given as (H.P::-~_) throughout this brief.
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returned to serve his sentence there.
~ashington's
hlS

Utah complied with

request and placed a detainer on appellant for

return to Utah after the completion of his Washington

sentence.
In April of 1976, appellant was transferred from
the Washington State Prison to the United States Penitentiary
in Marion, Illinois.

After his transfer, Utah placed a

detainer on appellant in Illinois.

In his petition, appellant

challenges the validity of this detainer on the grounds that
the above proceedings were improperly conducted.
ARGUMENT
POit'JT I
UNDER THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON
DETAINERS, APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE
GRANTED HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR UTAH'S
FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN HIM TO
WASHINGTON FOLLOWING HIS CONVICTION.
Appellant, who is presently serving time in the
federal prison at Marion, Illinois, claims that his
application for parole at that prison has been adversely
affected by a Utah detainer pending against him.

The detainer

pending against appellant relates to a 1970 Utah conviction

for robbery,

for which Utah seeks jurisdiction over appellant

to force appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence.

It

appears that appellant is claiming the detainer against him is
invalid because Utah violated the terms of the Interstate
~qreement on

Detainees when appellant was transferred to Utah
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in 1970 to try him on the robbery charge.

Appellant points

out that after his conviction in Utah he began serving his
sent.ence at the Utah State Prison before he was returned to
Wasnington.

Appellant was sentenced on October 27, 1970 and

was transferred to Washington on December 21, 1970 (T.R, 44 1
47).
Article II(e) of the IAD provides, "At the

earlies~

practicable time consonant with the purpose of this agreement,
the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state."
Appellant appears to contend that he should be granted habeas
corpus relief from his Utah conviction because Utah delayed
returning him to Washington.

ir.

This position is not supported

by the language of the IAD nor by caselaw.
The IAD is found in Utah Code Ann., § 77-29-5
(Supp. 1980).

(The IAD was previously found in Utah Code

Ann., § 77-65-4 (1953), as amended.)

Article IX of the IAD

begins, "This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to
effectuate its purpose."

The purpose of the IAD, as stated in

Article I, is to provide for the orderly and expeditious
disposition of detainers,

based on untried indictments,

informations, or complaints, because these outstanding charge:
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
In Saunders v. State, 397 A.2d 548 (Del. 1979), the
.
d iolation
defendant sought habeas corpus relief for an a 11 ege v
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of the IAD.
~laware,

In Saunders, the defendant had been sent to

convicted, and sentenced to 14 years in the state

~nitentiary.

This conviction was reversed, but in the

interim oetween the conviction and reversal the defendant was
convicted of murder.

The defendant claimed that he should

have been returned to the federal authorities after his
convict ion and not tried on new charges, which were not the
basis for the original detainer.
c~im

The Court rejected this

and dismissed his petition because the defendant failed

to particularize which section of the IAD had been violated
and because he failed to demonstrate how Delaware's delay in
returning him had violated the policies and purposes of the
IAD.

Therefore, unless a state's failure to comply with the

provisions of the IAD violates the policies or purposes of the
IAD, habeas corpus relief is not appropriate.
Further support for this conclusion is found in the
framework of the IAD.

In accordance with its purpose, to

provide for the expeditious disposition of untried charges
against a prisoner, the IAD prov ides that the charges against
a prisoner will be dismissed if the state where the charges
a~

pending fails to bring the defendant to trial prior to

returning him to the asylum state, or if the state fails to
accept temporary custody of the prisoner.
Article V(C).

Article IV(e) and

There are no penalties in the IAD for a

-5-
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violation of Article V(e).

Clearly,

the efficacy of the IAD

is not destroyed by the receiving state's failure to
immediately return a prisoner to the asylum state

follow~g

his conviction.
The case of Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F.Supp. 104j
(D.C.N.Y. 1979) further supports the position that habeas
corpus relief is not appropriate for a mere violation of the
!AD.

In Williams,

the court denied a habeas corpus petition ,

in which it was claimed that the IAD had been violated,
stating:
Since the heart of the agreement is
to protect a prisoner's rehabilitative
opportunities, a violation should be
considered in a federal collateral
proceeding in terms of prejudice it
causes a prisoner.
Id. at 1054.
The facts in the instant case establish that the
purposes of the IAD were effectuated and that appellant was
not prejudiced.

While serving a sentence in the Washingtoo

State Prison, appellant was transferred to Utah, pursuant to
the terms of the !AD, where he was convicted of robbery,
sentenced to the Utah State Prison and then returned to
Washington.

Thus,

the proper status of the detainer against

appellant was determined before he was returned to Washington.
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Appellant makes a few general representations that
he was prejudiced by having his term at the Utah State Prison
commenced before he was returned to Washington.

However,

there is no showing that appellant's rehabilitative
opportunities were affected by Utah's failure to immediately
return him to Washington.

Since i f and when appellant is

returned to Utah to finish serving his sentence he will be
given credit for the time served between October 27, 1970 and
December 21, 1970, there could be no harm.

In summary, habeas

corpus relief should not be granted appellant because the
purposes and policies of the IAD were not violated nor was he
prejudiced during the proceedings in Utah.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED
IF HE IS RETURNED TO UTAH TO SERVE HIS
SENTENCE.
Appellant also contends that if he is required to
return to Utah to serve his sentence, the principles of law,
set forth in White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1980)
and Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) would be
violated.

These cases are distinguishable from the instant

case and the principles adopted therein are wholly
inapplicable here.

-7-
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In White v. Pearlman, a prisoner, who was released
by mistake from prison due to no fault of his own,
re-established himself in society and was then forced to
return to prison to complete his sentence.

The court in

~

i

held that the prisoner's sentence had run while he was at
liberty.

The court reasoned it would be impossible for a

prisoner to ever re-establish himself if he were not allowed
to serve his sentence continuously.
In Shields v. Beto, the defendant had been
extradited from Texas, where he was serving a sentence, to a
Louisiana penitentiary.

Twenty-eight years following the

extradition, Texas tried to reacquire jurisdiction over him.
The court held that Texas had waived jurisdiction over the
defendant by extraditing him to Louisiana, especially where
Texas had failed to take any affirmative action to secure the

1

defendant's return.
In the instant case, appellant was transferred to
Utah pursuant to the terms of the IAD to be tried for robbery.
Under the IAD, Utah, as the receiving state, was obligated to
return appellant to Washington once the status of the charges
against hilil were determined.

To hold as petitioner suggests

that Utah waived jurisdiction over appel 1 ant by re tur ning hirr '
to v.·ashington would be contrary to the terms of the IAD.
such were the case any state, after trying a prisoner from
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If

another jurisdiction, would be faced with a dilemma.

It could

return the prisoner and lose the right to impose a sentence on
nirn or it could inunediately impose a sentence and violate the
terms of the IAD.

Therefore, it is implicit in the IAD that

when the sentence in the asylum state has been completed, the
receiving state can reacquire jurisdiction over a prisoner to
impose on him his sentence.
Furthermore,

in the instant case, unlike Shields,

Utah took immediate steps to reacquire jurisdiction over
appellant.

A detainer was filed in Washington after appellant

was returned, and a detainer was filed against appellant at
the federal prison in Illinois when he was transferred there.
The instant case is also distinguishable from White
in that the prisoner in White would have been severely
prejudiced if prison officials had been able to keep him in a
state of limbo, never allowing him to complete his sentence.
Here appellant has failed to show how Utah's delay in
returning him to Washington prejudiced him.
Habeas corpus relief is limited to extraordinary
circumstances.

This Court, in Brown v. Taylor, 21 Utah 2d 96,

4,U P.2d 968 (1968), outlined the limited scope of a writ of
naceas corpus.

-9-
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. It [habeas corpus] is not a
substitute for and cannot properly be
treated as a regular appellate review
[citation omitted].
I t is an
extraordinary remedy which is properly
invocable only when the court had no
jurisdiction over the person or the
offense, or where the requirements of law
have been so disregarded that the party
is substantially and effectively denied
due process of law, or where some such
fact is shown that it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine the
conviction [Citing Bryant v. Turner, 19
Utah 2d 2841 431 P.2d 121 (1967)].
Id. at 969.

Appellant's claims in the instant case do not

raise to the required level of seriousness to make the
granting of appellant's petition appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In 1970 appellant was transferred from

;v~shington

to Utah, under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, where "
was tried and convicted of robbery.
\~asnington and

Appellant was returned to

later transferred to the federal prison in

Marion, Illinois.

Pursuant to his Utah conviction, a detainer

was placed on appellant in Illinois.

Appellant does not

challenge the validity of his conviction; he seeks habeas
corpus relief on the grounds that Utah violated the IAD ~
failing to immediately return him to Washington after his
conviction.

However, Utah's delay in returning appellant to

vlashington did not violate the purposes or policies of the
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IAD nor did it prejudice appellant.

Under these circumstances

nabeas corpus relief is not appropriate, and the petition was
r,,roperly denied.
DATED this 8th day of December, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON

A&;;;;?;r~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copi2s of the foregoing brief, postage prepaid, to James
~1llard

Hearn, Attorney Pro Se, Box 1000, Marion, Illinois,

62959, this 8th day of December, 1981.
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